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Abstract
This article reviews the recent performance of the main Latin American economies, in a 
difficult external environment, owing to the slowdown in the world economy and the 
uncertainty associated with trade tensions. Growth in 2018 was lower than in 2017 and 
lower than projected at the start of the year, primarily on account of the severe recession 
in Argentina and a slower than expected recovery in Brazil. Activity is expected to be 
more positive in these countries in 2019, but a slowdown is forecast in Mexico. In 
addition, the risks remain predominantly on the downside. Among the internal risks, the 
uncertainty surrounding the economic policies to be implemented in Brazil and Mexico 
stands out. This issue is analysed in detail in this article.
Two other articles on specific aspects of the performance of the Latin American economies 
will be published together with this one: “Capital flows to emerging economies: recent 
developments and drivers”, and “The impact of China on Latin America: trade and foreign 
direct investment channels”.
Keywords: political uncertainty, low growth, fiscal space.
JEL codes: F01, F21, F30, F41.
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Since the publication of the last half-yearly report on the Latin American economy, in 
November 2018, the world economy has continued to slow, leading the central banks of 
the main developed economies, and the US Federal Reserve in particular, to put a brake 
on the normalisation of their monetary policy stance. This shift has caused the financial 
conditions facing emerging economies to return, generally, to more favourable levels, 
following the turbulence seen in the second half of 2018. Against this background, growth 
in the main Latin American economies1 in 2018 stood at 1.4%, 0.3 percentage points (pp) 
lower than in 2017 and significantly below the 3% expected at the beginning of the year. 
This poor performance stems, above all, from the severe recession in Argentina and the 
notably slow recovery in Brazil. Both these economies, as well as Mexico, were subdued 
at the turn of the year.
The forecasts for 2019 have been revised downwards and growth in the region as a 
whole is expected to stand slightly below 2% (see Chart 1). Argentina is projected to 
emerge from recession, although its growth rate for the year as a whole is still expected 
to be negative, while the Brazilian economy is projected to grow by somewhat less than 
2% in 2019, a higher rate than in Mexico (slightly over 1.5%), for the first time since 
2013.
The risks for the region originate in the external environment (arising from lower global 
growth and its possible effect on commodity prices, a possible tightening of international 
financial conditions and trade tensions) and in specific problems in certain countries. 
Notable among the latter is the risk that monetary and fiscal adjustment in Argentina will 
not succeed in anchoring inflation expectations and will have to be intensified, exacerbating 
the recession and compromising the success of the IMF programme.2 The uncertainty 
surrounding the reform of the pension system in Brazil and the doubts raised by the 
policies of the new Government in Mexico, which have in some cases reversed previous 
structural reforms, are also elements of concern and are addressed specifically in the box 
in this article (see Box 1). The limited scope available for monetary policy and, especially, 
fiscal policy to address these risks should be noted.
Against a background of deteriorating confidence and elevated uncertainty, driven by the 
persistent trade tensions and other risks of a political nature, the global economy has been 
decelerating. World GDP grew by 3.6% in 2018, 0.2 pp less than in 2017, with a declining 
trend during the year that extended into early 2019. This has been reflected in a downward 
revision in the growth outlook virtually across the board. Signs of weakness were also seen 
in the emerging economies as a result of the deterioration in confidence and world trade, 
albeit with differences from one area to another. The economic indicators of the Chinese 
economy have improved in recent months, following the stimulus measures implemented 
by the authorities. However, this improvement has not been passed through to other Asian 
economies, which have continued to slow, although they still have more momentum than 
other regions.
Introduction
Recent developments in 
the Latin American 
economy
THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
AND DEVELOPMENTS IN 
FINANCIAL MARKETS
1  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, which the article refers to, in aggregate terms, as “the 
region”. No data are available for Venezuela.
2  See the analytical article “Argentina: economic challenges in an adverse international setting” (https://www.bde.
es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/InformesBoletinesRevistas/ArticulosAnaliticos/2018/T4/descargar/
Files/beaa1804-art31e.pdf).
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The general deterioration in the growth outlook led to an adjustment in the financial markets 
(especially in the developed ones) at the end of 2018, and the central banks of the main 
advanced economies revised their plans to normalise their monetary policy stances. In 
particular, the Federal Reserve has toned down its projected interest rate rises, at the same 
time as announcing that the process of balance sheet downsizing will end in September. 
The European Central Bank (ECB) has extended the period during which it expects official 
rates to remain at their current levels and has announced full reinvestment of the securities 
acquired within the framework of the asset purchase programme, as well as a new round of 
long-term refinancing operations, in order to maintain favourable credit access conditions. 
Towards the end of 2018, emerging financial markets, sustained largely by idiosyncratic 
factors, performed better than developed ones. Following the change in the Federal 
Reserve’s monetary policy stance, at the very start of 2019, there was a substantial 
improvement (see Chart 2.1). The stimulus measures adopted in China and the prospects 
of a trade agreement with the United States also contributed to this improvement, although 
such prospects have recently been perceived more negatively again (see Chart 2.2). 
However, episodes of adjustment occurred again in markets with major external 
vulnerabilities (Argentina and Turkey).
Developments on emerging financial markets were somewhat more favourable in Latin 
America than in the rest of the world, owing to the region’s weaker links with global value 
chains, which are more exposed to the protectionist tensions, the recovery in the oil price 
and the initially favourable reaction to the measures announced by the new Governments 
of Brazil and Mexico, which led to currency appreciation and rising stock markets, especially 
in the first case (see Charts 2.3 and 2.4). Argentina, however, was hit by a new wave of 
turbulence from mid-March, reflected in further depreciation of the peso and rises in the risk 
premium (see Chart 2.5), related mainly to the deterioration in the inflation indicators and 
the increase in political risk associated with the uncertainty surrounding the results of the 
presidential elections to be held in the autumn. The problems of the state oil company 
SOURCE: Latin American Consensus Forecasts.
Following the sharp deterioration in forecasts described in the October 2018 report, the growth forecast for the region for 2019 has been reduced by a 
further 0.4 percentage points (pp) to 1.8%, due to global environment risks and especially the uncertainty surrounding the economic programmes in Brazil 
and Mexico, their slowdown in the last quarter of 2018 and the effects of the monetary and fiscal adjustment in Argentina. The growth forecasts for the 
other economies remained stable, or decreased slightly.
THE REGION'S GROWTH FORECAST IS REDUCED AGAIN, MAINLY DUE TO THE DOWNWARD REVISION 
FOR MEXICO AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT, FOR BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA
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SOURCES: Banco de España, Thomson Reuters and JP Morgan.
Advanced and emerging markets were influenced by the outlook for protectionism, world growth and monetary policy in the advanced economies, so 
that a sustained improvement was observed from the beginning of the year, following the trade truce and the change in tone of Federal Reserve 
communication. The Latin American markets benefited, moreover, from the increase in commodities prices and the initial favourable reaction to the new 
policies of the Brazilian Government. Financial conditions initially tightened and subsequently eased to their previous levels. They remain very loose, 
especially in Brazil.
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PEMEX caused Mexican markets to deteriorate towards the end of the period examined. All 
told, financial conditions since the beginning of the year have been easier (see Chart 2.6).
The net issuance of bonds on international markets was negative in the second half of 
2018, for the first time since 2007 (see Chart 3.1), while gross inflows of portfolio investment 
fell to their lowest levels since the start of 2016, basically due to the outflows recorded by 
Brazil (see Chart 3.2). By contrast, the most stable form of external financing, foreign direct 
investment, rose during the second half, especially in Brazil (see Chart 3.3). International 
reserves stood at historically high levels (see Chart 3.4).
Activity in the main Latin American economies as a whole continued to grow slowly in the 
second half of 2018  with quarter-on-quarter growth rates of 0.4% and 0.3% in the third and 
fourth quarters, respectively (see Table 1 and Chart 4).3 However, these rates mask uneven 
ACTIVITY AND DEMAND
SOURCES: Datastream, Dealogic, Institute of International Finance, JPMorgan, IMF and national statistics.:
a Four-quarter cumulated data.
The region's external deleveraging continued, with negative net issuance of fixed income on international markets. There was an increase in the most 
stable financing (FDI) and a decline in portfolio investment inflows. Reserves barely changed during the six-month period, except in Argentina.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
 BRAZIL  MEXICO  COLOMBIA
 CHILE  OTHER  LATIN AMERICA
3  LATIN AMERICA: DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS (a)
$bn
EXTERNAL DELEVERAGING CONTINUED APACE CHART 3
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
MATURITIES ISSUES NET ISSUANCE
1  LATIN AMERICA: FIXED-INCOME ISSUANCE ON INTERNATIONAL MARKETS
$bn
5
18
31
44
57
70
83
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
BRAZIL MEXICO
VENEZUELA (right-hand scale) ARGENTINA (right-hand scale)
4  LATIN AMERICA: INTERNATIONAL RESERVES
$bn
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
 BRAZIL  MEXICO  ARGENTINA
 OTHER  LATIN AMERICA
2  LATIN AMERICA: PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT FLOWS (a)
$bn
DownloadEXCEL
Excel
3  In Venezuela, where official figures continue to be unavailable, the indicators show that the economy remains in 
a deep recession and beset by hyperinflation, in accordance with the customary definitions.
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SOURCES: Thomson Reuters and national statistics.
a Seasonally adjusted.
b Latin America 6: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Latin America 5: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
c Four-quarter moving average.
2017 2017 2017 2017 2018 2018 2018 2018
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 April
GDP (quarter-on-quarter rate) (a)
    Latin America 6 (b) 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.6 -0.3 0.4 0.3
    Argentina 0.4 1.3 1.5 1.0 -0.2 -4.7 -0.5 -1.2
    Brazil 1.5 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.1
    Mexico 0.4 0.4 -0.4 1.1 1.0 -0.2 0.6 0.2
    Chile -0.9 0.9 2.3 0.8 1.1 0.6 0.2 1.3
    Colombia -0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.8 0.6
    Peru -0.1 0.6 1.4 0.4 1.2 1.6 -0.5 2.5
GDP (year-on-year rate)
    Latin America 6 (b) 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.7 1.8 2.2 2.2 1.2 1.4 1.0
    Argentina 2.7 -2.5 0.3 2.1 3.8 4.5 4.1 -3.8 -3.7 -6.2
    Brazil 1.1 1.1 0.1 0.6 1.4 2.2 1.2 0.9 1.3 1.1
    Mexico (a) 2.3 2.0 3.2 3.1 1.6 1.5 2.1 1.5 2.6 1.7
    Chile 1.3 4.0 -0.4 0.4 2.0 3.0 4.7 5.3 2.6 3.6
    Colombia (a) 1.4 2.7 1.1 1.9 1.4 1.0 2.2 2.6 2.9 2.9
    Peru 2.5 4.0 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.3 3.2 5.5 2.4 4.8
CPI (year-on-year rate)
    Latin America 5 (b) 4.3 3.8 4.7 4.4 4.0 4.1 3.6 3.5 4.2 4.1 4.3
    Brazil 3.5 3.7 4.9 3.6 2.6 2.8 2.8 3.3 4.4 4.1 4.9
    Mexico 6.0 4.9 5.0 6.1 6.5 6.6 5.3 4.6 4.9 4.8 4.4
    Chile 2.2 2.7 2.8 2.3 1.7 2.0 2.5 2.6 3.1 2.9 2.0
    Colombia 4.3 3.2 5.1 4.3 3.7 4.1 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.3 3.2
    Peru 2.8 1.3 3.4 3.2 3.0 1.7 0.9 1.0 1.3 2.1 2.6
Budget balance (% of GDP) (c)
    Latin America 6 (b) -4.7 — -5.2 -5.5 -5.0 -4.7 -5.0 -4.8 -4.8 -4.5
    Argentina -5.9 -5.0 -4.6 -5.2 -5.5 -5.9 -5.7 -5.1 -4.8 -5.0
    Brazil -7.8 -7.1 -9.1 -9.5 -8.8 -7.8 -7.4 -7.3 -7.2 -7.1
    Mexico -1.0 -2.1 -1.3 -1.9 -1.1 -1.0 -2.8 -2.7 -2.5 -2.1
    Chile -2.7 -1.7 -3.3 -2.9 -2.7 -2.7 -2.7 -2.6 -2.1 -1.7
    Colombia -3.3 — -4.2 -4.2 -3.2 -3.3 -3.0 -3.8 -4.6 -3.1
    Peru -3.2 -2.0 -2.2 -2.6 -3.0 -3.2 -3.4 -2.4 -2.1 -2.0
Public debt (% of GDP)
    Latin America 6 (b) 56.0 60.4 53.7 53.8 54.8 55.4 56.0 58.4 60.1 59.2
    Argentina 56.8 85.9 47.6 46.0 48.0 51.6 54.3 66.3 83.8 74.6
    Brazil 74.0 76.7 71.3 72.8 73.8 74.0 75.3 77.4 77.2 76.7
    Mexico 46.9 46.8 47.2 45.9 46.7 46.9 46.7 47.4 46.5 46.8
    Chile 23.6 24.0 21.9 22.5 23.0 23.6 24.6 23.5 23.9 24.0
    Colombia 43.4 47.1 42.8 43.0 43.5 43.4 43.5 45.0 45.9 47.1
    Peru 24.9 25.7 23.0 24.2 24.3 24.9 23.8 23.7 23.9 25.7
Current account balance (% of GDP) (c)
    Latin America 6 (b) -1.7 -2.0 -2.0 -1.8 -1.7 -1.7 -1.7 -1.9 -2.1 -2.0
    Argentina -4.9 -5.4 -3.0 -3.6 -4.3 -4.9 -5.5 -6.2 -6.4 -5.4
    Brazil -0.4 -0.8 -1.0 -0.7 -0.5 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 -0.8
    Mexico -1.7 -1.8 -2.4 -1.9 -1.8 -1.7 -1.6 -1.7 -1.7 -1.8
    Chile -2.1 -3.1 -2.2 -2.4 -2.0 -2.1 -1.6 -1.8 -2.2 -3.1
    Colombia -3.3 -3.8 -4.1 -4.0 -3.7 -3.3 -3.0 -3.1 -3.2 -3.8
    Peru -1.2 -1.5 -2.0 -1.2 -0.7 -1.2 -1.2 -1.4 -1.7 -1.5
External debt (% of GDP)
    Latin America 6 (b) 34.4 — 35.4 34.7 35.0 34.4 35.3 34.7 35.2 37.0
    Argentina 36.5 53.6 34.5 34.4 35.2 36.5 41.2 45.0 46.8 53.6
    Brazil 32.5 35.6 35.2 33.5 33.6 32.5 33.3 32.2 33.3 35.5
    Mexico 28.7 27.9 28.7 28.5 28.9 28.7 29.1 28.5 28.2 27.9
    Chile 65.4 — 64.4 65.3 65.3 65.3 63.6 59.4 60.1 61.8
    Colombia 40.0 39.9 40.9 40.0 40.6 40.0 39.9 38.9 38.6 39.9
    Peru 35.9 34.7 37.7 38.6 38.0 35.9 34.8 33.6 33.6 34.8
2017 2018
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS TABLE 1
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behaviour across countries. Activity continued to contract in Argentina in the second half of the 
year (four consecutive quarters), albeit less sharply than in the second quarter. In Brazil and 
Mexico, following a fairly dynamic third quarter, GDP again decelerated notably at the end of the 
year; by contrast, GDP in Chile and Peru picked up in the fourth quarter, following a slump in the 
third one. Activity was more stable in Colombia, holding around its potential growth rate. As a 
result, in 2018 as a whole the aggregate GDP of the region grew by 1.4%, below the rate 
recorded in the previous year (1.7%) and lower than the projection at the beginning of the year: 
Brazil grew at the same rate as in 2017 (1.1%), Mexico 0.3 pp less (2%) and the greater 
dynamism of the Andean economies was more than offset by the fall of 2.5% in Argentina. The 
data for the first quarter of the year suggest that activity continued to be weak.4
SOURCES: Thomsom Reuters and national statistics.
a Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
b The dots represent the April 2019 forecasts for 2019 and 2020 by Latin American Consensus Forecasts.
The growth of the region decreased to 1.4% in 2018 from 1.7% in 2017. Argentina posted four consecutive quarters of falls in GDP and Brazil and Mexico 
decelerated sharply in Q4. By contrast, the growth of Chile and Peru picked up in Q4 after decelerating in Q3, and that of Colombia held steady. By 
component, the most notable developments were the turnaround in external demand (Argentina), the contribution of which turned positive in Q4, and the 
gradual decrease in the contribution from the components of domestic demand (mainly private consumption and investment), despite the favourable 
behaviour of these factors in the Andean economies.
DECELERATION OF THE REGION'S GROWTH IN Q2 AND IN THE YEAR AS A WHOLE, WITH UNEVEN 
BEHAVIOUR ACROSS COUNTRIES
CHART 4
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4  For example, the preliminary GDP estimate of Mexico in 2019 Q1 was a quarter-on-quarter growth rate of –0.2%.
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By component, the notable vitality of domestic demand in the Andean economies, where 
investment also recouped a certain dynamism, was not sufficient to offset the deceleration 
in Mexico, the weakness in Brazil (particularly in the fourth quarter) and the fall in Argentina; 
in particular these economies did not shake off their investment sluggishness. Credit to the 
private sector in real terms reflected the behaviour of demand, which was most notable for 
the weakness in Mexico and the negative growth rates in Brazil, albeit on an improving 
trend (see Chart 5.2).
Net external demand contributed positively to GDP growth in Q4 (after seven consecutive 
quarters of negative contribution) due to its strong improvement in Argentina (+10.3 pp), 
largely explained by the collapse of imports. In fact, the current account deficit contracted 
notably in Argentina in 2018 Q45 due to shifts in the trade balance, while Brazil, Mexico 
SOURCE: Thomson Reuters.
a Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
Unemployment rates generally held steady in 2018, with a slight decrease in the high rate of Brazil. Real credit to the private sector recovered in year-on- 
year terms in Chile and Brazil, and decreased in Mexico. The current account deficit increased across the board in 2018, although Argentina showed a 
notable decrease in Q4. The terms of trade worsened in the second half of the year.
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5  In Table 1 and Chart 4 this adjustment is not perceptible because it is presented in the usual manner using a 
four-quarter moving average.
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and Peru continued to post small deficits, in historical terms, owing to the favourable 
performance of their trade balances. In Colombia, the external deficit remained high, 
although easily financed by the net inflow of foreign direct investment, while in Chile it 
increased in the second half of 2018 as a result of a fall in the goods surplus and an 
increase in the income deficit, owing to the profits transferred to foreign firms (see Chart 
5.3). The terms of trade, defined as the ratio of a country’s export prices to its import 
prices, a key variable in these economies which are mostly commodity exporters, showed 
a certain worsening trend (see Chart 5.4). 
The labour markets of the region did not show significant changes in unemployment rates; 
the high unemployment in Brazil continued to be notable (see Chart 5.1).
Inflation has continued to fall in the last few months (see Chart 6.1) as a result of the 
favourable performance of the non-core component, while core inflation has held steady 
(see Chart 6.2). In those countries with an inflation target, inflation was in the target ranges, 
except for Mexico. This country’s failure to meet its inflation target explains its tight 
monetary policy stance, with two rises of 25 basis points (bp) in the official interest rate in 
November and December last year, and the restrictive bias of the announcements by the 
Banco de México. The central bank of Chile also raised its official interest rate by 25 bp in 
January, after a similar increase in October, although no new rises are expected in the near 
future in view of the behaviour of inflation (partly due to methodological changes in its 
calculation) and of the change in the US Federal Reserve’s monetary policy stance. Also, 
the central banks of Brazil, Colombia and Peru have held their interest rates unchanged for 
the past year. It should be noted that the inflation expectations for the end of 2019 are 
consistent with the achievement of the targets of this group of countries (see Table 2).
In Argentina, inflation continued rising to stand at 54.7% in March. This was a result of the 
depreciation of the peso, which rapidly passed through to prices, the reduction of transport 
subsidies and the continued worsening of expectations. In view of this, the central bank 
announced additional monetary policy tightening measures, reducing by 10% its year-end 
monetary base target with respect to the original goal, which was already very restrictive.6 
Additionally, to reaffirm its commitment to the price stability target, the central bank 
undertook to sustain a minimum interest rate of 62.5% in April, by absorbing the necessary 
liquidity to do so. And since the end of April it may sell dollars, even if the peso-dollar 
exchange rate stands within what was previously known as the “non-intervention zone” 
and the amount of pesos resulting from these sales will be subtracted from the monetary 
base target. Finally, to counter the depreciation pressure on the peso, the Government 
proceeded to auction dollars, for a sum of nearly US $9,600 million, with a limit of US $60 
million daily, until the end of the year.7
In the fiscal policy arena (see Chart 7), at the end of 2018 Brazil’s government deficit was 
still high (7.1% of GDP, with an interest burden of 5.5 pp), despite the correction in the last 
three years, and its government debt ratio exceeded 77% of GDP, after having increased 
more than 25 pp in the last five years. The approval of the pension reform submitted to 
Parliament by the new Government (see Box 1) is essential in order to be able to comply 
INFLATION AND ECONOMIC 
POLICIES 
6  The measures announced by the central bank include: i) extension of the zero growth target for the monetary 
base to the end of 2019 (previously there was a commitment until June 2019); ii) continued over-achievement of 
the zero growth target for the monetary base in February (the monthly growth was negative), and iii) elimination 
of the seasonality adjustment (increase) of the monetary base scheduled for June.
7  A portion of these dollars comes from disbursements by the IMF following entry into the agreement and a portion 
comes from short-term government debt issues in dollars (known as “LETES”, the Spanish acronym of Letras del 
Tesoro de la Nación – treasury bills of the nation).
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SOURCE: Thomson Reuters.
a Aggregate of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
Inflation in the region decreased until March and April, when the non-core component rose across the board. In Argentina the ongoing rise persists. Core 
inflation held steady in the five countries with inflation targets, where it stood within the target ranges. Official interest rates have held unchanged in Brazil, 
Colombia and Peru for the past year, and those of Mexico and Chile have been increasing moderately. Inflation expectations for 2019 are compatible with 
the targets set by the central banks.
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a April 2019 Consensus Forecasts for the end of the year.
b Argentina suspended its monetary policy framework based on inflation targeting and temporarily adopted a monetary policy based on monetary base growth 
limits (ceiling of 0% m-o-m for the monetary base until December 2019, in which month it changed to a certain positive growth for seasonal reasons).
c Brazil's inflation target for 2019 is 4.25% ± 1.5, and for 2020 it is 4.00% ±1.5.
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with the limit on government expenditure set for the coming years, although doubts remain 
as to the reform which may finally be approved by Parliament. 
There seem to be fiscal risks in Mexico related basically to the situation of the government-
owned oil company PEMEX, because of the perception that the Mexican government 
would provide it with financial support if necessary. In any event, Mexico posted a primary 
surplus in 2018 and the budget envisages maintaining it in 2019 (at 1% of GDP) and 2020 
(at 1.3%), albeit with optimistic assumptions as to GDP growth and oil production,8 and 
government debt remains unchanged. PEMEX’s problems, which have led various rating 
agencies to downgrade its rating, are of a structural nature and arise from its high debt 
(debt to asset ratio of nearly 100%), its tax burden (more than 80% of its profits are 
transferred to the government in the form of taxes and other obligations) and its low 
productivity. In this respect, the decisions taken by the new Government, which temporarily 
suspend the overall investment of PEMEX with the private sector and refocus the business 
on refining rather than extraction, aggravate the problem.
Argentina is proceeding with the sharp fiscal adjustment for the period 2018-2020 included 
in the IMF programme. However, it seems that the zero primary balance target for 2019 will 
be achieved with lower revenue and expenditure than previously anticipated. The 
government debt was near to 80% of GDP at the end of 2018, an increase of more than 
20 pp in the year, due to the effect of the depreciation of the peso, since more than 75% 
of the government debt is denominated in foreign currency. In the other countries of the 
region there were no major changes in the fiscal balances, although the fiscal leeway for 
providing stimuli, should they be necessary, is small. In Chile, discussion continues on the 
proposed fiscal reform, and that approved in Colombia has a lower impact than originally 
SOURCE: Thomson Reuters.
a Light shading, primary deficit; dark shading, interest burden.
b 2018 Q3.
Brazil ended 2018 with a very high government deficit (7.1% of GDP) despite the decrease of nearly 3 pp of GDP in the past three years, and with a 
government debt of 77% of GDP. Argentina continued its fiscal adjustment. The high increase in its government debt is due to the sharp depreciation of 
the peso arising from the high percentage of its government debt denominated in foreign currency. Mexico again posted a primary surplus in 2018.
THE GOVERNMENT DEFICIT DECREASED IN ALL COUNTRIES IN 2018 EXCEPT IN MEXICO, 
ALTHOUGH THE MARKED FISCAL IMBALANCES REMAINED IN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL
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8  At the beginning of April, the Mexican Government announced it would reduce public spending by 0.5% of GDP 
in 2019, in consonance with the similar decrease in expected revenue.
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proposed, which poses doubts as to whether the fiscal rule will be complied with in the 
coming years,9 all the more so considering that the increase in government expenditure 
associated with the admission of Venezuelan immigrants is nearly 0.5 pp of GDP.
The growth projections for the region in 2019 were revised downwards with respect to the 
previous half-yearly report by 0.4 pp to 1.8% (see Chart 1). The revisions affect all countries 
and partly reflect the lower buoyancy at the end of 2018. The decrease of 0.5 pp in Mexico’s 
expected growth is linked partly to the uncertainty surrounding the policies of the new 
Government and partly to tighter monetary conditions since the beginning of 2018. For the 
first time since 2013, the Brazilian economy is forecast to grow faster than that of Mexico 
(slightly below 2%). In Argentina, the carryover effect from 2018 will give rise to negative 
average growth for 2019, even though positive year-on-year rates are recorded in all 
quarters this year. The region’s growth forecast for 2020 is 2.5%, owing to the expected 
upturn in Argentina and Brazil. This growth will be close to the region’s potential growth 
rate, although it will still be insufficient to drive convergence towards higher income levels.
The balance of risks is tilted downwards. In the external environment, since the previous 
half-yearly report was published, the growth expectations of the main economies have 
been adjusted downwards and tensions have reappeared in the financial markets, 
rekindling fears over the performance of some emerging economies with weaker 
fundamentals, including some Latin American economies. On the trade front, the 
preliminary agreement between the United States, Canada and Mexico has still not been 
approved in the respective legislative chambers, a process which may turn out to be more 
difficult than expected in view of the change in the party holding a majority in the US 
House of Representatives. Moreover, a heightening of trade tensions between the United 
States and China or a sharper-than-expected slowdown in the latter economy may have 
adverse effects on global growth10 and commodity prices, and unleash an adjustment of 
global financial conditions. Such a tightening of global financial conditions, particularly if 
accompanied by commodity price falls, might lead to capital outflows11 and downward 
pressure on currencies, and hence to procyclical fiscal and monetary policies. 
The internal risks inherent in implementation of the agreements between the IMF and the 
Argentinian government persist, particularly in view of the lack of anchorage of inflation 
expectations and the increasingly uncertain electoral environment. In Brazil and Mexico, 
now that the electoral uncertainty has passed, it remains to be seen what course the 
policies of the new governments will take. In Brazil there are difficulties in implementing a 
reform agenda and a fiscal adjustment, including principally the Social Security reform. In 
Mexico, against a background of a fall in agents’ confidence and economic downturn, the 
risks are associated with the possibility of an about-face in some structural reforms and 
the future performance of PEMEX.
Data cut-off date: 10.5.2019.
Date of publication: 14.5.2019.
OUTLOOK 
 9  Corporate income tax will be progressively reduced from 2020.
10  See “The impact of China on Latin America: trade and foreign direct investment channels”, Analytical Articles, 
Economic Bulletin, 2/2019, Banco de España, which analyses some transmission channels through which the 
slowdown in the Chinese economy passes through to the Latin American economies.
11  See “Capital flows to emerging economies: recent developments and drivers”, Analytical Articles, Economic 
Bulletin, 2/2019, Banco de España.
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The results of the 2018 presidential elections in Brazil and Mexico 
brought major changes with respect to previous Governments. 
The weight of these two economies1 is such that the new 
Governments’ actions, and the success or failure of their policies, 
potentially affect the whole region.
In Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro appointed an economic team favourable 
to deregulating the economy (including privatising some state-
owned companies), rationalising and simplifying the federal tax 
system, granting greater independence to the central bank and 
reforming the pension system. Brazil’s greatest vulnerability lies in 
the fiscal realm where it has been running a very high budget 
deficit since 2014 which, coupled with low growth, prompted debt 
to rise by 26 pp in five years, to 77% by end-2018 (Chart 1). The 
cost of servicing the debt, mostly denominated in reais, is linked to 
the policy interest rate which bottomed out in 2018, after falling by 
almost 8 pp since end-2016. The debt was placed in domestic 
markets, where investment funds and pension funds hold 52% of 
the total amount outstanding, at the same time as the proportion 
held by foreign investors has dropped to its lowest level since 
2012. The primary balance component which deteriorated most 
was Social Security (Chart 1) due to demographic factors, the 
easing of eligibility criteria and higher funding for certain social 
programmes and the linking of some of them to the minimum 
wage (pensions) or to income (education and health).2
The central planks of the proposed pension system reform 
presented by the new Brazilian Government are as follows: i) an 
increase in the retirement age and in the compulsory pension 
contribution period; ii) a decrease in disability and widow(er)s’ 
pensions; iii) limits on the accumulation of benefits among core 
family members; iv) limits on Social Security programmes in states 
and municipalities, rules for improved monitoring of fraud and 
more effective action against the Social Security System’s largest 
debtors; v) elimination of the link between the minimum wage and 
certain social benefits; vi) an increase in public-sector employees’ 
contributions and a decrease in those of employees earning the 
equivalent to the minimum wage; and vii) the creation of a funded 
system, with a guaranteed minimum income (financed by the 
public sector, if necessary), freedom of choice, transferability and 
public or private ownership of the pension funds.
The reform is estimated to produce savings of 15% of GDP in ten 
years. According to the Government’s calculations, the reform 
would stabilise the government debt ratio at 75% of GDP in 2030 
and lead to GDP growth of 1 pp higher than in the baseline 
scenario in 2030 (3.3%). The Government also aimed to debate a 
constitutional amendment in the Senate to eliminate the 
compulsory nature of some budgetary expenditure items, which 
restrict its room for manoeuvre to make fiscal adjustments but 
Congress approved the compulsory nature of many investment 
expenditure items, making the budget even more rigid.
Bolsonaro’s victory was welcomed by the markets and the cost of 
domestic and external debt dropped sharply (Chart 2). However, 
the Government is encountering difficulties in approving the 
reforms since it is supported by pressure groups whose interests 
might conflict with those of its own, especially as regards 
privatisations3 and external liberalisation;4 these tensions were 
reflected in the geopolitical risk indicators (Chart 2). Accordingly, 
the pension system reform has to be approved by a qualified 
majority of 3/5 of the members (since it is a constitutional reform), 
in a highly fragmented Congress. This could lead to a diluted 
version of the original reform proposal and, therefore, a reduction 
in the saving envisaged.
On 1 July 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador was elected 
President of Mexico,5 backed by a coalition of parties which 
support a programme of government comprising three main 
pillars. First, to foster “inclusive and sustainable” economic growth 
through the modernisation of transport and urban infrastructures, 
the increase in oil production with the reform of PEMEX’s 
governance and of its investment plan, as well as to promote other 
sectors such as tourism. Second, “to improve well-being and 
reduce inequality” by raising pensions, the minimum wage and 
certain subsidies and by increasing the coverage of the health and 
education systems. Third, to focus on institutions and reduce 
crime and corruption.
With these objectives in mind, the Government approved a raft of 
reforms in different areas, which in some cases reverse those 
approved by the previous Administration, with possible 
consequences for Mexico’s potential growth. For example, in the 
energy sector, the Government’s efforts have focused on achieving 
a surplus on the oil trade balance (which is currently showing a 
deficit as Mexico imports most of its by-products, such as petrol, 
to satisfy domestic market demand) through a “national plan to 
boost refining” and aid for PEMEX. However, this action does not 
address the company’s structural problems which may ultimately 
impact the sustainability of the fiscal situation and, possibly, 
macroeconomic stability (Charts 3 and 4). Furthermore, the 
Government suspended indefinitely the tenders for oil and gas 
exploration and exploitation projects on the grounds of checking 
the transparency of the contracts which had already been granted. 
This may place further restrictions on foreign direct investment 
and hinder its positive effects on oil production.
BOX 1THE MEASURES PROPOSED BY THE NEW GOVERNMENTS OF BRAZIL AND MEXICO
1  In 2018, Brazil’s GDP at purchasing power parity was equivalent to 39% 
of the aggregate of the six economies included in this report, in 
comparison with Mexico which represented 30%.
2  For a more detailed analysis, including a description of the reform 
proposed by the previous Government and an estimate of the fiscal 
multiplier in Brazil, see the “Report on the Latin American economy. 
Second half of 2018” (https://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/
Publicaciones/InformesBoletinesRevistas/ArticulosAnaliticos/2018/T4/
descargar/Files/beaa1804-art30e.pdf).
3  There was talk of privatising Petrobras, Electrobras and the large public 
banks, whereas now the privatisations refer to the sale of holdings in 24 
essentially infrastructure companies.
4  The Government aimed to open up the economy by entering into 
bilateral trade agreements but this seems to have been delayed until 
after the pension reform has been approved.
5  He took up his position on 1 December 2018.
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A measure with a broader reach is that to reduce the funds available 
for independent sectoral regulatory and oversight bodies, which 
includes setting a ceiling on wages. Other reforms which have been 
implemented or are under debate affect aspects of taxation, the 
legal system and security, and social policies. These include, most 
notably, an increase of 16% in the minimum wage in 2019 (to 
approximately $5 per day) and by 100% (to approximately $9 per 
day) in areas bordering on the United States. The governing party6 
put forward a proposal in the financial sector to increase the 
population’s rate of financial inclusion by limiting bank charges 
which prompted the Mexican stock market to shed 6% in November. 
However, following certain modifications, a consensus was reached 
in respect of the reform by the parties involved (regulators and anti-
trust bodies, the central bank and most commercial banks).
The use of public consultations by the Government has increased 
financial uncertainty. In particular, the cancellation of the new 
Mexico City Airport project due to the result of a public vote with a 
turnout of less that 1% of the population, led to higher volatility on 
financial markets, although this was curtailed when an agreement 
was reached with the creditors affected.
BOX 1 THE MEASURES PROPOSED BY THE NEW GOVERNMENTS OF BRAZIL AND MEXICO (cont’d)
SOURCES: Banco Central do Brasil and Thomsom Reuters Datastream.
Fiscal vulnerability in Brazil stems from the situation of the Social Security System, which the new Government proposes to reform with savings of almost 
15% of GDP. However, gaining approval from Congress will be an arduous task. In Mexico, PEMEX's delicate situation (declining production and high 
debt) may ultimately affect the sustainability of fiscal policy and, possibly, macroeconomic stability, considering the close link between PEMEX and 
sovereign bonds, and the importance of oil-related tax revenue (4% of GDP).
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THE REFORM OF PENSIONS AND OF PEMEX, RESPECTIVELY, ARE THE MAIN CONCERNS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENTS 
OF BRAZIL AND MEXICO
6  The National Regeneration Movement (Morena by its Spanish 
abbreviation).
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In short, after the uncertainty surrounding the elections in Brazil and 
Mexico has been dispelled, doubts persist about the policies that will 
be implemented by the new Governments. In Brazil, this is due to the 
difficulty of approving reforms that are necessary, but have a high 
political cost. In Mexico, this is owing to subsequent changes in the 
policies that were initially announced and because some of them 
involve reversing structural reforms implemented by the previous 
Government, which could have negative effects on potential growth.
BOX 1 THE MEASURES PROPOSED BY THE NEW GOVERNMENTS OF BRAZIL AND MEXICO (cont’d)
